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Abstract
A social choice function (SCF) is robustly implementable in rationalizable strate-
gies if every rationalizable strategy profile on every type space results in outcomes
consistent with it. First, we establish an equivalence between robust implementation
in rationalizable strategies and “weak rationalizable implementation”. Second, using
the equivalence result, we identify weak robust monotonicity as a necessary and al-
most sufficient condition for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies. This
exhibits a contrast with robust implementation in interim equilibria, i.e., every equilib-
rium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with the SCF. Bergemann and
Morris (2011) show that strict robust monotonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient
condition for robust implementation in interim equilibria. We argue that strict robust
monotonicity is strictly stronger than weak robust monotonicity, which further implies
that, within general mechanisms, robust implementation in rationalizable strategies is
more permissive than robust implementation in interim equilibria. The gap between
robust implementation in rationalizable strategies and that in interim equilibria stems
from the strictly stronger nonemptiness requirement inherent in the latter concept.
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1 Introduction
We consider robust (full) implementation of a social choice function (SCF) in (interim cor-
related) rationalizable strategies. That is, we want the designer to construct a mechanism
such that every rationalizable strategy profile results in outcomes that are consistent with
the SCF regardless of the players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about each other’s types.
We thus take a global approach to robustness, following the seminal work of Bergemann
and Morris (2005, 2009, 2011). We however depart from the work of Bergemann and Morris
in terms of the solution concept: They assume interim equilibrium whereas we assume ra-
tionalizability as the solution concept. On a given type space, rationalizability is a weaker
solution concept than interim equilibrium, and it characterizes outcomes that are consistent
with common knowledge of rationality (Dekel et al., 2007)
We first characterize robust implementation in rationalizable strategies as equivalent to
weak rationalizable implementation. In the appendix of their working paper, Bergemann and
Morris (2010) define weak rationalizable implementation by imposing conditions directly on
messages that are “rationalizable” for payoff types. These messages survive the following
iterative deletion process: At each stage, for each payoff type of each player, delete every
message that is never a best response to any belief over the other players’ payoff types and
their messages that have survived until the previous stage. Weak rationalizable implemen-
tation imposes two conditions: Firstly, if a message profile is rationalizable for a payoff-type
profile, then it should be consistent with the SCF at that payoff-type profile. Secondly,
each first-order type (i.e., a pair of payoff type and first-order belief) of each player has a
nonempty best response to some belief over the rationalizable messages of the payoff types
of the other players.
The equivalence between robust implementation in rationalizable strategies and weak
rationalizable implementation proves useful on two counts: First, we use it to identify weak
robust monotonicity (weak RM) as a necessary and almost sufficient condition for robustly
implementing an SCF in rationalizable strategies. Second, as the name suggests, weak ratio-
nalizable implementation is weaker than “rationalizable implementation”. Bergemann and
Morris (2011) show that robust implementation in interim equilibria implies rationalizable
implementation – the converse is true under a particular restriction on the mechanisms. It
then follows from our equivalence result that if an SCF is robustly implementable in interim
equilibria, then it is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies.
Bergemann and Morris (2011) show that strict robust monotonicity (strict RM) is nec-
essary and almost sufficient for robust implementation in interim equilibria – as well as
rationalizable implementation. Strict RM implies weak RM. The converse is true for “re-
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sponsive” SCFs but not more generally. In Example 6.2, we present an SCF that satisfies
weak RM but not strict RM. Thus, there exist SCFs that are robustly implementable in
rationalizable strategies but not in interim equilibria. Figure 1 summarizes the relationships
between different implementation and monotonicity concepts.
We can understand the gap between robust implementation in rationalizable strategies
and that in interim equilibria by comparing the strength and weakness of the two desiderata
in the respective definitions. For a given solution concept (interim equilibrium or rational-
izability), robust implementation requires: (i) Nonemptiness : The solution concept must
be nonempty on every type space and (ii) Uniqueness : Every outcome associated with the
solution concept on every type space must be consistent with the SCF. It turns out that the
uniqueness requirement for robust implementation is the same regardless of whether we use
rationalizability or interim equilibrium as the solution concept. This is because (a) every
interim equilibrium action is rationalizable on a given type space and (b) every rationaliz-
able action on a given type space can be obtained in interim equilibrium on another type
space. The latter result is known in the literature on epistemic foundations (see, for instance,
Remark 2 in Dekel et al., 2007). It therefore follows that the gap between robust implemen-
tation in rationalizable strategies and that in interim equilibria is due to the strictly stronger
nonemptiness requirement imposed by the latter solution concept. That is, it is possible that
rationalizable strategies exist and the SCF is implementable in rationalizable strategies on all
type spaces but there exists a type space on which the mechanism has no interim equilibria.
If we restrict the designer to use finite mechanisms, then interim equilibria will exist on
all type spaces. Hence, robust implementation in interim equilibria and that in rationalizable
strategies are equivalent under this restriction. The designer will thus be compelled to use
countably infinite mechanisms if her aim is to robustly implement an SCF in rationalizable
strategies which cannot be robustly implemented in interim equilibria. The implementation
literature relies on countably infinite mechanisms to obtain tight necessary and sufficient
conditions. In that spirit, we too construct a countably infinite mechanism to prove that
weak RM is almost sufficient for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies. However,
such constructions have been criticized for being impractical (see, for e.g., Jackson, 1992).
In the context of complete information environments, Bergemann et al. (2011) show
that the necessary condition for implementation in rationalizable strategies is stronger than
Maskin monotonicity, which is necessary and almost sufficient for Nash implementation
(Maskin, 1999). In their Section 5, they also give an example of a Nash implementable SCF
that is not implementable in rationalizable strategies. Recently, Xiong (2018) has provided
a complete characterization of SCFs that are implementable in rationalizable strategies.
The implementing mechanism in Xiong (2018) also Nash implements the SCF. Thus, in
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Robust Implementation
in Interim Equilibria
By Def. & Cor. 6.1
===============⇒
Prop. 6.6
⇐================
(Finite Mechanisms)
Robust Implementation
in Rationalizable Strategies
~w BM’s Th. 3 ~w Th. 3.1
Rationalizable
Implementation
By Def.
======⇒
Weak Rationalizable
Implementation
~w BM’s Th. 1 & 2 ~w Th. 4.3 & 5.5
Strict Robust Monotonicity
By Def.
======⇒
Lm. 4.6
⇐===============
(Responsive SCFs)
Weak Robust Monotonicity
Figure 1: Summary of relationships between different implementation and monotonicity concepts.
BM stands for Bergemann and Morris (2011); Cor. stands for Corollary; Def. stands for Definition;
Lm. stands for Lemma; and Th. stands for Theorem.
complete information environments, the designer can implement a strictly larger set of SCFs
in equilibrium than in rationalizable strategies.1 In an interesting contrast, we show that
the designer can robustly implement a strictly larger set of SCFs in rationalizable strategies
than in equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the preliminary definitions in
Section 2. In Section 3, we show the equivalence between robust implementation in rational-
izable strategies and weak rationalizable implementation. In Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
we show that weak RM is necessary and almost sufficient for robust implementation in ra-
tionalizable strategies. We compare robust implementation in rationalizable strategies and
that in interim equilibria in Section 6 before concluding in Section 7.
1This is true only for SCFs. For multi-valued social choice correspondences, implementation in rational-
izable strategies is strictly weaker than Nash implementation, as shown in Kunimoto and Serrano (2019).
Also see Jain (2018).
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2 Preliminaries
There is a finite set of players I = {1, . . . , n}. A player’s payoff type is θi ∈ Θi, where we
assume that Θi is finite. A payoff state is θ ∈ Θ = ×i∈NΘi. Denote Θ−i ≡ Θ1×· · ·×Θi−1×
Θi+1×· · ·×Θn.
2 There is a countable set of alternatives A with at least two elements. We let
∆(A) to be the set of lotteries over A.3 We denote an arbitrary lottery by ℓ, and let a be the
lottery that puts probability 1 on alternative a. For any lottery ℓ, let ℓ[a] be the probability
assigned by ℓ to a ∈ A. Let Z be any countable set of indices. For any countable set of
lotteries {ℓz}z∈Z and corresponding weights {αz}z∈Z such that αz ≥ 0, ∀z, and
∑
z∈Z αz = 1,
we let
∑
z∈Z αzℓz be the lottery that is obtained as a reduced form of the compound lottery
in which for all z ∈ Z, lottery ℓz is selected with probability αz.
We endow A with the discrete topology. Thus, A is separable and completely metrizable
by the discrete metric, and hence it is a Polish space. As a result, ∆(A) is also Polish under
the weak∗ topology (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 15.15). Therefore, ∆(A) contains
a countable dense subset, which we denote by ∆∗(A).
Preferences of player i over the set of lotteries are represented by the von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility function ui : ∆(A)×Θ→ ℜ. Thus, for any payoff state θ and
lottery ℓ, ui(ℓ, θ) =
∑
a∈A ℓ[a]ui(a, θ). We assume that utilities are bounded to ensure that
expected utility is well defined over the space of lotteries with countable support, i.e., for all
i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ, there exists ζ > 0 such that |ui(ℓ, θ)| ≤ ζ for all ℓ ∈ ∆(A).
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2.1 Type Space
A type space is a collection T = (Ti, θˆi, πˆi)i∈I such that for each i ∈ I, Ti is countable,
θˆi : Ti → Θi and πˆi : Ti → ∆(T−i). A player’s type ti ∈ Ti defines her payoff type θˆi(ti) ∈ Θi
and her belief type πˆi(ti) ∈ ∆(T−i). For any t−i ∈ T−i, we let πˆi(ti)[t−i] denote the probability
that player i of type ti assigns to other players having types t−i. We assume that θˆi : Ti → Θi
is surjective for all i ∈ I, i.e., no payoff type is redundant.
For each i ∈ I, let H0i = Θi be the space of zero
th-order types of player i. Letting
Z1i = ∆(H
0
−i), we can define H
1
i = Θi × Z
1
i to be the space of first-order types of player i.
Thus, the first-order type h1i = (θi, z
1
i ) specifies player i’s payoff type θi and her belief z
1
i
regarding the payoff types of all other individuals. Iterating this way, we define Hki = Θi×Z
k
i
to be the space of kth-order types of player i, where Zki = ∆(H
k−1
−i ). Finally, we define
H∞i = ×
∞
k=0H
k
i as the set of i’s all infinite hierarchy of beliefs (h
0
i , h
1
i , h
2
i , . . .).
2Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
3For any set X , we will use ∆(X) to denote the set of probability measures over X .
4See Blackwell and Girshick (1954) for an axiomatization of expected utility over all discrete probability
measures on a set, which results in bounded utilities.
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There is an infinite hierarchy of beliefs (h0i (ti), h
1
i (ti), h
2
i (ti), . . .) ∈ H
∞
i corresponding to
each type ti ∈ Ti: viz., h
0
i (ti) = θˆi(ti); h
1
i (ti) = (θˆi(ti), z
1
i (ti)), where z
1
i (ti) is such that
z1i (ti)[θ−i] =
∑
t−i:θˆ−i(t−i)=θ−i
πˆi(ti)[t−i] for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i; in general, h
k
i (ti) = (θˆi(ti), z
k
i (ti)),
where zki (ti) is such that z
k
i (ti)[h
k−1
−i ] =
∑
t−i:h
k−1
−i (t−i)=h
k−1
−i
πˆi(ti)[t−i] for all h
k−1
−i ∈ H
k−1
−i .
2.2 Social Choice Function and Mechanism
The planner’s objective is specified by a social choice function (henceforth, SCF) as a function
f : Θ→ ∆(A).
We say that the SCF f is responsive to θi and θ
′
i, denoted by θ
′
i 6∼
f
i θi, if f(θi, θ−i) 6=
f(θ
′
i, θ−i) for some θ−i ∈ Θ−i. Otherwise, f is non-responsive to θi and θ
′
i, denoted by
θ
′
i ∼
f
i θi.
The SCF f is responsive if for all i ∈ I and θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi: θi 6= θ
′
i ⇒ θi 6∼
f
i θ
′
i. Otherwise, f
is non-responsive.
A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g), where Mi is a countable nonempty set of messages for
player i, M = ×i∈IMi, and g : M → ∆(A) is the outcome function. The mechanism
Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) is finite if Mi is finite for all i ∈ I.
2.3 Rationalizable Strategies
Fix a type space T and mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g). A message correspondence profile
S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where each
Si : Ti → 2
Mi\∅.
Let S be the collection of all such message correspondence profiles. The collection S is a
complete lattice with the natural ordering of set inclusion: S ≤ S
′
if Si(ti) ⊆ S
′
i(ti) for all
i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti. The largest element is S¯ = (S¯1, . . . , S¯n), where S¯i(ti) = Mi for each i ∈ I
and ti ∈ Ti. The smallest element is S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where Si(ti) = ∅ for each i ∈ I and
ti ∈ Ti.
We define the best response operator b : S→ S as follows:
bi(S)[ti] ≡


mi ∈Mi :
∃λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that
(i) mi ∈ arg max
m
′
i
∈Mi
∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i, m−i)ui(g(m
′
i, m−i), θˆ(ti, t−i))
(ii) margT−iλi = πˆi(ti)
(iii) λi(t−i, m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ S−i(t−i)


,
where S−i(t−i) = ×j 6=iSj(tj) for each t−i ∈ T−i.
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Starting with the largest element S¯ of S, we iteratively eliminate never best responses
using the operator b. That is, starting with the message correspondence B0 = (B01 , . . . , B
0
n)
such that B0 = S¯, for each k ≥ 1, iteratively define the message correspondence Bk =
(Bk1 , . . . , B
k
n) such that for each player i ∈ I and type ti ∈ Ti,
Bki (ti) = bi(B
k−1)[ti].
Observe that b is increasing by definition: i.e., S ≤ S
′
⇒ b(S) ≤ b(S
′
). It therefore
follows that Bk ≤ Bk−1 for all k ≥ 1.
As the best response operator b is increasing and S is a complete lattice, by Tarski’s fixed
point theorem, there is a largest fixed point of b, which we label B∞. Thus, (i) b(B∞) = B∞
and (ii) b(S) ≥ S ⇒ S ≤ B∞.
B∞ is the (interim correlated) rationalizable message correspondence profile (Dekel et al.,
2007). For each type of each player, it characterizes the messages that are consistent with
common certainty of rationality. In general, B∞ ≤ Bk for all k, i.e., B∞i (ti) ⊆
⋂∞
k=1B
k
i (ti)
for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I. If message sets are finite, B
∞
i (ti) =
⋂∞
k=1B
k
i (ti). In this case, we
can also construct the fixed point B∞ by starting with S¯ – the largest element of the lattice
– and iteratively applying the operator b. But when the mechanism is countably infinite,
transfinite induction may be necessary to reach the fixed point. Thus, in this case, B∞i (ti)
are the set of messages surviving (transfinite) iterated deletion of never best responses of
type ti of player i. We refer the reader to Lipman (1994) for the formal treatment.
2.4 S∞ Correspondences
As we will see, insisting on implementation that is robust to the underlying type space will
force the solution concept to depend only on the payoff types of the individuals. Hence, we
need to define strategies that are “rationalizable” for payoff types.
Fix a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g). A message correspondence profile with payoff-type
domain S = (S1, . . . ,Sn), where each
Si : Θi → 2
Mi\∅
Let SΘ be the collection of such message correspondence profiles with payoff-type domain.
The collection SΘ is a complete lattice with the natural ordering of set inclusion: S ≤ S
′
if Si(θi) ⊆ S
′
i(θi) for all i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi. The largest element is S¯ = (S¯1, . . . , S¯n), where
S¯i(θi) = Mi for each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi. The smallest element is S = (S1, . . . ,Sn), where
Si(θi) = ∅ for each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi.
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We define the best response operator for payoff types bΘ : SΘ → SΘ as follows:
bΘi (S)[θi] ≡


mi ∈Mi :
∃ψi ∈ (Θ−i ×M−i) such that
(i) mi ∈ argmax
m
′
i
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui(g(m
′
i, m−i), (θi, θ−i))
(ii) ψi(θ−i, m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ S−i(θ−i)


,
where S−i(θ−i) = ×j 6=iSj(θj) for each θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
As the operator bΘ is increasing and SΘ is a complete lattice, by Tarski’s fixed point
theorem, there is a largest fixed point of bΘ, which is S∞. Thus, (i) bΘ(S∞) = S∞ and (ii)
bΘ(S) ≥ S ⇒ S ≤ S∞.
2.5 Notions of Implementation
In this section, we discuss various notions of implementation. The first one is robust imple-
mentation in rationalizable strategies, which is the focus of this paper.
2.5.1 Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies
To define robust implementation in rationalizable strategies, we start by defining what we
mean by implementation on a specific type space in rationalizable strategies.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) implements the SCF f on the type space T
in rationalizable strategies if, for all t ∈ T , we have
(nonemptiness) B∞(t) 6= ∅ and (uniqueness) g(m) = f(θˆ(t)), ∀m ∈ B∞(t).
We now define robust implementation in rationalizable strategies as implementation over
“all type spaces” in rationalizable strategies.
Definition 2.2. A mechanism Γ robustly implements the SCF f in rationalizable strategies
if, for all type spaces T , the mechanism implements f on T in rationalizable strategies. The
SCF f is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a mechanism that
robustly implements f in rationalizable strategies.
2.5.2 Robust Implementation in Interim Equilibria
Bergemann and Morris (2011) analyze two notions of implementation: robust implementa-
tion in interim equilibria and rationalizable implementation.
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To define the former, consider a type space T and a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g). The
resulting incomplete information game is denoted by (T ,Γ). A strategy for individual i in
this game is a mapping σi : Ti → ∆(Mi). A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is an interim
equilibrium of the game (T ,Γ) if, for all i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and mi ∈ Mi with σi(ti)[mi] > 0, we
have
∑
t−i∈T−i
πˆi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i∈M−i
σ−i(t−i)[m−i]ui
(
g(mi, m−i), θˆ(ti, t−i)
)
≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
πˆi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i∈M−i
σ−i(t−i)[m−i]ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), θˆ(ti, t−i)
)
, ∀m
′
i ∈Mi.
We then have the following notion of interim implementation:
Definition 2.3. A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) interim implements the SCF f on the type
space T if (nonemptiness) the game (T ,Γ) has an interim equilibrium and (uniqueness) for
every interim equilibrium σ of the game (T ,Γ), if σ(t)[m] > 0, then g(m) = f(θˆ(t)).
Robust implementation in interim equilibria is defined as interim implementation “over
all type spaces”.
Definition 2.4. A mechanism Γ robustly implements the SCF f in interim equilibria if, for
all type spaces T , the mechanism Γ interim implements f on T . The SCF f is robustly
implementable in interim equilibria if there exists a mechanism that robustly implements f
in interim equilibria.
2.5.3 Rationalizable Implementation
Bergemann and Morris (2011) define rationalizable implementation by directly imposing two
conditions on the S∞ correspondence, as defined below.
Definition 2.5. A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) rationalizably implements the SCF f if
1. (uniqueness) m ∈ S∞(θ)⇒ g(m) = f(θ); and
2. (nonemptyness) For each i ∈ I and z1i ∈ Z
1
i , there exists a belief ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i)
such that:
(a) arg max
m
′
i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
6= ∅ for all θi ∈ Θi.
(b) ψi(θ−i, m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i).
(c) margΘ−iψi = z
1
i .
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The SCF f is rationalizably implementable if there exists a mechanism that rationalizably
implements f .
Bergemann and Morris (2011, Theorem 3) prove that if a mechanism robustly implements
an SCF in interim equilibria, then the same mechanism also rationalizably implements the
SCF. They also prove that the converse is true whenever the mechanism that rationalizably
implements the SCF is such that the message correspondence S∞ satisfies the ex post best
response property. The property requires that for all i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi, there exist a message
m∗i ∈ S
∞
i (θi) such that
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi∈Mi
ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
,
for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i and m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i).
2.5.4 Weak Rationalizable Implementation
The nonemptiness requirement in rationalizable implementation (the second condition in
Definition 2.5) is strong: It requires that for any individual i and for any belief z1i that
i might have over the payoff types of others, there exists a belief ψi over S
∞
−i(θ−i) such
that individual i has a best response to this belief regardless of her payoff type. In the
appendix of their working paper, Bergemann and Morris (2010) define weak rationalizable
implementation which weakens the nonemptiness requirement by allowing the belief ψi to
depend on the payoff type of individual i.
Definition 2.6. A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) weakly rationalizably implements the SCF f
if
1. (uniqueness) m ∈ S∞(θ)⇒ g(m) = f(θ); and
2. (nonemptyness) For each i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi and z
1
i ∈ Z
1
i , there exists a belief ψi ∈
∆(Θ−i ×M−i) such that:
(a) arg max
m
′
i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
6= ∅.
(b) ψi(θ−i, m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i).
(c) margΘ−iψi = z
1
i .
The SCF f is weakly rationalizably implementable if there exists a mechanism that weakly
rationalizably implements f .
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3 Equivalence between Robust Implementation in Ra-
tionalizable Strategies and Weak Rationalizable Im-
plementation
We now show that robust implementation in rationalizable strategies is equivalent to weak
rationalizable implementation because the former imposes the same conditions on S∞ as the
latter.
Theorem 3.1. The SCF f is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies by the mech-
anism Γ if and only if f is weakly rationalizably implementable by Γ.
Proof. We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Consider any mechanism Γ. The message profile m ∈ S∞(θ) if and only if
there exists a type space T such that m ∈
⋃
t∈T :θˆ(t)=θ B
∞(t).
Proof. (⇒) Bergemann and Morris (2011, Proposition 1) show that ifm ∈ S∞(θ), then there
exist a type space T , a pure-strategy interim equilibrium σ, and a type profile t such that
σ(t) = m and θˆ(t) = θ. Therefore, m ∈ B∞(t).
(⇐) Consider any type space T . Define the message correspondence profile with payoff-
type domain Sˆ = (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆn) such that for all i ∈ I,
Sˆi(θ
′
i) =
⋃
ti:θˆi(ti)=θ
′
i
B∞i (ti), ∀θ
′
i ∈ Θi.
If m
′
i ∈ Sˆi(θ
′
i), then there exists t
′
i ∈ Ti such that θˆi(t
′
i) = θ
′
i and m
′
i ∈ B
∞
i (t
′
i). Thus, there
exists a belief λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that
m
′
i ∈ arg max
m
′′
i ∈Mi
∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i, m−i)ui(g(m
′′
i , m−i), θˆ(t
′
i, t−i)),
margT−iλi = πˆi(t
′
i) and λi(t−i, m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ B
∞
−i(t−i).
Define ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i) as follows:
ψi(θ−i, m−i) =
∑
t−i:θˆ−i(t−i)=θ−i
λi(t−i, m−i), ∀θ−i, m−i.
Then ψi(θ−i, m−i) > 0 implies that m−i ∈
⋃
t−i:θˆ−i(t−i)=θ−i
B∞−i(t−i) = Sˆ−i(θ−i). Moreover, by
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construction,
m
′
i ∈ arg max
m
′′
i ∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui(g(m
′′
i , m−i), (θ
′
i, θ−i)).
Thus, m
′
i ∈ b
Θ
i (Sˆ)[θ
′
i]. Hence, b
Θ(Sˆ) ≥ Sˆ. Therefore, Sˆ ≤ S∞.
Now suppose there exist m ∈ M and θ ∈ Θ such that m ∈
⋃
t:θˆ(t)=θ B
∞(t). Then
m ∈ Sˆ(θ), and hence m ∈ S∞(θ). This completes the proof of the lemma.
We prove the necessity part of Theorem 3.1 first.
Suppose the SCF f is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies by the mecha-
nism Γ. Then the following is true for all type spaces T : For all t ∈ T , we have
B∞(t) 6= ∅ and g(m) = f(θˆ(t)), ∀m ∈ B∞(t).
Pick any θ ∈ Θ. If m ∈ S∞(θ), then it follows from Lemma 3.2 that there exists a type
space T
′
such that m ∈
⋃
t∈T
′ :θˆ(t)=θ B
∞(t). Hence, g(m) = f(θ).
Next, pick any i, θi and z
1
i . For each j 6= i, pick any z
1
j ∈ Z
1
j . Define the type space T
such that (i) Tj = {t
θ˜j
j : θ˜j ∈ Θj} for all j ∈ I, and (ii) θˆj(t
θ˜j
j ) = θ˜j and πˆj(t
θ˜j
j )[t
θ˜−j
−j ] = z
1
j (θ˜−j)
for all t
θ˜j
j ∈ Tj and t
θ˜−j
−j ∈ T−j.
By our hypothesis of robust implementation in rationalizable strategies, B∞i (t
θi
i ) 6= ∅.
Therefore, there exists λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that
1. argmax
m
′
i
∑
t
θ
−i
−i ,m−i
λi(t
θ−i
−i , m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), θˆ(t
θi
i , t
θ−i
−i )
)
6= ∅.
2. margT−iλi = πˆi(t
θi
i )
3. λi(t
θ−i
−i , m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ B
∞
−i(t
θ−i
−i ).
Define ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i) as follows: for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i and m−i ∈M−i,
ψi(θ−i, m−i) = λi(t
θ−i
−i , m−i).
Then ψi(θ−i, m−i) > 0 implies that m−i ∈ B
∞
−i(t
θ−i
−i ). It follows from Lemma 3.2 that
m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i). Lastly, by construction, margΘ−iψi = z
1
i and
arg max
m
′
i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui(g(m
′
i, m−i), (θi, θ−i)).
We prove the sufficiency part of Theorem 3.1 next.
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Suppose that the SCF f is weakly rationalizably implementable by the mechanism Γ.
Consider any type space T . If m ∈ B∞(t), then it follows from Lemma 3.2 that m ∈
S∞(θˆ(t)). Hence, g(m) = f(θˆ(t)).
We now show that B∞(t) 6= ∅ for all t ∈ T . Define the message correspondence profile
Sˆ = (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆn) such that, for all i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti,
Sˆi(ti) = S
∞
i (θˆi(ti)).
Pick any type ti ∈ Ti. By our hypothesis of weak rationalizable implementability, there
exists a belief ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i) such that
(a) arg max
m
′
i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θˆi(ti), θ−i)
)
6= ∅.
(b) ψi(θ−i, m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i).
(c) margΘ−iψi = z
1
i (ti).
By the definition of S∞i (θˆi(ti)), we have
∅ 6= arg max
m
′
i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θˆi(ti), θ−i)
)
⊆ S∞i (θˆi(ti)).
Since Sˆi(ti) = S
∞
i (θˆi(ti)), we also have Sˆi(ti) 6= ∅.
We now show that Sˆi(ti) ≤ bi(Sˆ)[ti]. Consider any message m˜i ∈ Sˆi(ti). By our hypothesis
of weak rationalizable implementability, we have that for any θ ∈ Θ, m
′
∈ S∞(θ)⇒ g(m
′
) =
f(θ). Since m˜i ∈ S
∞
i (θˆi(ti)) and ψi(θ−i, m−i) > 0 implies m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i), by weakly
rationalizable implementability, we have
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m˜i, m−i), (θˆi(ti), θ−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
f(θˆi(ti), θ−i), (θˆi(ti), θ−i)
)
.
Thus, either every message in Sˆi(ti) is a best response to ψi or none of the messages in Sˆi(ti)
is a best response to ψi. But, as already argued,
Sˆi(ti) = S
∞
i (θˆi(ti)) ⊇ arg max
m
′
i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θˆi(ti), θ−i)
)
6= ∅.
Thus, every message in Sˆi(ti) is a best response to ψi.
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Now pick any mi ∈ Sˆi(ti). As argued above,
mi ∈ arg max
m
′
i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θˆi(ti), θ−i)
)
.
Define the belief λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that for all (t−i, m−i) ∈ T−i ×M−i,
λi(t−i, m−i) =
{
πˆi(ti)[t−i]
(
ψi(θˆ−i(t−i),m−i)
z1i (ti)[θˆ−i(t−i)]
)
, if πˆi(ti)[t−i] > 0
0, otherwise.
Since
∑
m−i
ψi(θˆ−i(t−i), m−i) = z
1
i (ti)[θˆ−i(t−i)], we have margT−iλi = πˆi(ti). Moreover,
λi(t−i, m−i) > 0⇒ ψi(θˆ−i(t−i), m−i) > 0⇒ m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θˆ−i(t−i)) = Sˆ−i(t−i).
Finally, for all m
′
i ∈Mi,
∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), θˆ(ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i,m−i

 ∑
t−i:θˆ−i(t−i)=θ−i
πˆi(ti)[t−i]
ψi(θ−i, m−i)
z1i (ti)(θ−i)
ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θˆi(ti), θ−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θˆi(ti), θ−i)
)
,
where the last equality follows because
∑
t−i:θˆ−i(t−i)=θ−i
πˆi(ti)[t−i] = z
1
i (ti)(θ−i). Hence, we
must have
mi ∈ arg max
m
′
i∈Mi
∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), θˆ(ti, t−i)
)
.
We thus conclude that mi ∈ bi(Sˆ)[ti].
As b(Sˆ) ≥ Sˆ, we have Sˆ ≤ B∞. Pick any t ∈ T . Then B∞(t) 6= ∅ because, as already
shown, Sˆ(t) 6= ∅. This completes the proof of the theorem.
4 Necessary Condition
We now apply the equivalence result presented in the previous section to present the key
necessary condition for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies.
A deception is a profile of correspondences β = (β1, . . . , βn) such that βi : Θi → 2
Θi \ ∅
and θi ∈ βi(θi) for all θi ∈ Θi and i ∈ I. A deception β is unacceptable if there exist θ ∈ Θ
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and θ
′
∈ β(θ) for which f(θ) 6= f(θ
′
); otherwise, β is acceptable.
For each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi, define
Yi[θi] ≡

y : Θ−i → ∆(A) :
∀θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
either y(θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i)
or ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
> ui
(
y(θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)

 .
Thus, Yi[θi] is the collection of all mappings y : Θ−i → ∆(A) such that for every θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
the lottery y(θ−i) is either equal to f(θi, θ−i) or strictly worse than f(θi, θ−i) for individual
i in state (θi, θ−i).
Definition 4.1. We say that an unacceptable deception β is weakly refutable if there exist
i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi) satisfying θ
′
i 6∼
f
i θi such that for all θ˜i ∈ Θi and ψi ∈
∆(Θ−i ×Θ−i) satisfying ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0⇒ θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i), there exists y ∈ Yi[θ˜i] such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
Definition 4.2. The SCF f satisfies weak robust monotonicity (weak RM) if every unac-
ceptable deception β is weakly refutable.
Here is the main result of this section:
Theorem 4.3. If the SCF f is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f
satisfies weak RM.
Proof. Suppose the mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) robustly implements f in rationalizable
strategies. It follows from Theorem 3.1 that Γ weakly rationalizably implements f . We now
argue that f must satisfy weak RM.
Pick any i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ. Consider the belief z1i ∈ ∆(Θ−i) that puts probability one on
θ−i. By weak rationalizable implementability, there exists a belief ψ
θ
i ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i) such
that
(a) arg max
m˜i∈Mi
∑
θ˜−i,m˜−i
ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i)ui
(
g(m˜i, m˜−i), (θi, θ˜−i)
)
6= ∅.
(b) ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i) > 0⇒ m˜−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ˜−i).
(c) margΘ−iψ
θ
i = z
1
i .
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If θ˜−i 6= θ−i, then ψ
θ
i (θ˜−i, m˜−i) = 0 because margΘ−iψ
θ
i = z
1
i and z
1
i assigns probability
one on θ−i. Therefore, for all m˜i ∈Mi,
∑
θ˜−i,m˜−i
ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i)ui
(
g(m˜i, m˜−i), (θi, θ˜−i)
)
=
∑
m˜−i∈S
∞
−i(θ−i)
margM−iψ
θ
i (m˜−i)ui
(
g(m˜i, m˜−i), θ
)
= ui

 ∑
m˜−i∈S
∞
−i(θ−i)
margM−iψ
θ
i (m˜−i)g(m˜i, m˜−i), θ

 . (1)
Define the set of lotteries
Li(θ) =


∑
m˜−i∈S
∞
−i(θ−i)
margM−iψ
θ
i (m˜−i)g(m˜i, m˜−i) : m˜i ∈Mi

 .
Pick any mi ∈ argmaxm˜i∈Mi
∑
θ˜−i,m˜−i
ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i)ui
(
g(m˜i, m˜−i), (θi, θ˜−i)
)
. Then mi ∈
S∞i (θi) because ψ
θ
i (θ˜−i, m˜−i) > 0 implies m˜−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ˜−i). Therefore, by weak rationalizable
implementability, ∑
m˜−i∈S
∞
−i(θ−i)
margM−iψ
θ
i (m˜−i)g(mi, m˜−i) = f(θ).
Moreover, for all m˜i ∈Mi, we have
ui

 ∑
m˜−i∈S
∞
−i(θ−i)
margM−iψ
θ
i (m˜−i)g(mi, m˜−i), θ

 = ∑
θ˜−i,m˜−i
ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i)ui
(
g(mi, m˜−i), (θi, θ˜−i)
)
≥
∑
θ˜−i,m˜−i
ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i)ui
(
g(m˜i, m˜−i), (θi, θ˜−i)
)
= ui

 ∑
m˜−i∈S
∞
−i(θ−i)
margM−iψ
θ
i (m˜−i)g(m˜i, m˜−i), θ

 ,
where the first and last equality follows from (1). Hence, ui
(
f(θ), θ
)
≥ ui
(
ℓ, θ
)
for all
ℓ ∈ Li(θ).
We next claim that for any ℓ ∈ Li(θ), ℓ 6= f(θ) implies ui
(
f(θ), θ
)
> ui
(
ℓ, θ
)
. Suppose not.
Then there is some ℓ ∈ Li(θ) such that ℓ 6= f(θ) but ui
(
ℓ, θ
)
≥ ui
(
f(θ), θ
)
. By construction
of Li(θ), there exists a message m˜i such that
∑
m˜−i∈S
∞
−i(θ−i)
margM−iψ
θ
i (m˜−i)g(m˜i, m˜−i) = ℓ.
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Then, as per the above arguments, ui(ℓ, θ) ≥ ui(f(θ), θ) is equivalent to
∑
θ˜−i,m˜−i
ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i)ui
(
g(m˜i, m˜−i), (θi, θ˜−i)
)
≥
∑
θ˜−i,m˜−i
ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i)ui
(
g(mi, m˜−i), (θi, θ˜−i)
)
,
for some mi ∈ argmaxm˜′i∈Mi
∑
θ˜−i,m˜−i
ψθi (θ˜−i, m˜−i)ui
(
g(m˜
′
i, m˜−i), (θi, θ˜−i)
)
. Therefore, m˜i is
also a best response to the belief ψθi when i’s payoff type is θi. Hence, m˜i ∈ S
∞
i (θi). But
g(m˜i, m˜−i) 6= f(θ) for at least one m˜−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i), which contradicts weak rationalizable
implementation of f .
We are now ready to prove the theorem. Consider any deception β. Define the message
correspondence profile with payoff-type domain S = (S1, . . . ,Sn) such that
Si(θi) =
⋃
θ
′
i∈βi(θi)
S∞i (θ
′
i).
Suppose β is not weakly refutable. Then, by definition of weak refutablility, for all i ∈ I,
θi ∈ Θi, and θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi) satisfying θ
′
i 6∼
f
i θi, there exist θ˜i and ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i × Θ−i), which
satisfies ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0⇒ θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i), such that for all y ∈ Yi[θ˜i], we have
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
. (2)
We first show that for any i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi) satisfying θ
′
i ∼
f
i θi, there exist
θ˜i ∈ Θi and ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i × Θ−i) satisfying ψi(θ−i, θ−i) > 0 ⇒ θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i) such that (2)
holds for all y ∈ Yi[θ˜].
Pick any i, θi, and θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi) satisfying θ
′
i ∼
f
i θi. We set θ˜i = θi and the belief ψi ∈
∆(Θ−i × Θ−i) such that ψi(θˆ−i, θˆ−i) = 1 for some θˆ−i ∈ Θ−i. As θˆ−i ∈ β−i(θˆ−i), the belief
ψi satisfies ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0⇒ θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i). Since θi ∼
f
i θ
′
i, we have f(θ
′
i, θˆ−i) = f(θi, θˆ−i).
Moreover, Yi[θ˜i] = Yi[θi] because θ˜i = θi. Therefore, for all y ∈ Yi[θ˜i], we have
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
= ui
(
f(θi, θˆ−i), (θi, θˆ−i)
)
≥ ui
(
y(θˆ−i), (θi, θˆ−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
Thus, if we combine the above result with the hypothesis that β is not weakly refutable,
then we can hypothesize that for all i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi), there exist θ˜i ∈ Θi and
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ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i × Θ−i) satisfying ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0 ⇒ θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i) such that (2) holds for all
y ∈ Yi[θ˜i].
We next show that bΘ(S) ≥ S. Pick any i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and m
′
i ∈ Si(θi). We now
construct a belief ψΓ ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i) satisfying ψ
Γ
i (θ−i, m−i) > 0 implies m−i ∈ S−i(θ−i)
such that m
′
i is a best response for agent i of payoff type θi against ψ
Γ
i .
By definition of S, we have m
′
i ∈ S
∞
i (θ
′
i) for some θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi). Then, by our hypothesis,
there exist θ˜i ∈ Θi and ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×Θ−i) satisfying ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0⇒ θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i) such
that (2) holds for all y ∈ Yi[θ˜i]. Define the belief ψ
Γ
i ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i) as follows: for any
(θ−i, m−i),
ψΓi (θ−i, m−i) =
∑
θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)×margM−iψ
(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
i (m−i).
By construction, ψΓi (θ−i, m−i) > 0 implies that there exists θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i such that ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) >
0 and margM−iψ
(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
i (m−i) > 0. But ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0 implies θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i). Moreover,
margM−iψ
(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
i (m−i) > 0 implies m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ
′
−i) – recall the definition of ψ
(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
i from
the beginning of this proof. Since θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i) and m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ
′
−i), it follows from the
definition of S that m−i ∈ S−i(θ−i).
For any mi ∈Mi, define y
mi : Θ−i → ∆(A) as follows: for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
ymi(θ−i) =
∑
m−i
margM−iψ
(θ˜i,θ−i)
i (m−i)g(mi, m−i).
By construction, ymi(θ−i) ∈ Li(θ˜i, θ−i). Therefore, if f(θ˜i, θ−i) 6= y
mi(θ−i), then, as argued
earlier in the proof, we must have
ui
(
f(θ˜i, θ−i), (θ˜i, θ−i)
)
> ui
(
ymi(θ−i), (θ˜i, θ−i)
)
.
So ymi ∈ Yi[θ˜i]. By our hypothesis, (1) holds for all y ∈ Yi[θ˜i]. Hence, for any mi ∈Mi,
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
ymi(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
. (3)
18
We are ready to show that m
′
i is a best response for agent i of payoff type θi against ψ
Γ
i .
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψΓi (θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i,m−i

∑
θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)×margM−iψ
(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
i (m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (θi, θ−i)
)


(by definition of ψΓi )
=
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
(
by weak rationalizable implementability of f because m
′
i ∈ S
∞
i (θ
′
i)
and margM−iψ
(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
i (m−i) > 0 implies m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ
′
−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
ymi(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
(∵ inequality (3) holds for any mi ∈Mi)
=
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)

∑
m−i
margM−iψ
(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
i (m−i)ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
(by definition of ymi)
=
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψΓi (θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
(by definition of ψΓi ).
Since m
′
i is a best response for agent i of payoff type θi against ψ
Γ
i and ψ
Γ
i (θ−i, m−i) > 0
implies m−i ∈ S−i(θ−i), it follows by definition that m
′
i ∈ b
Θ
i (S)[θi].
As bΘ(S) ≥ S, we have S ≤ S∞. For any θ ∈ Θ and θ
′
∈ β(θ), we obtain S∞(θ
′
) 6= ∅
since the mechanism Γ weakly rationalizably implements f . So pick any m
′
∈ S∞(θ
′
) ⊆
S(θ) ⊆ S∞(θ). Then g(m
′
) = f(θ
′
) and g(m
′
) = f(θ) because, once again, the mechanism Γ
weakly rationalizably implements f . Thus, f(θ
′
) = f(θ). So β is acceptable. This completes
the proof.
For responsive SCFs, Bergemann and Morris (2010) identify a necessary condition for
weak rationalizable implementation that is a priori stronger than weak RM. We present an
equivalent definition below.
Definition 4.4. We say that an unacceptable deception β is strictly refutable if there exist
i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi) satisfying θ
′
i 6∼
f
i θi such that for all ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i × Θ−i)
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satisfying ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0⇒ θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i), there exists y ∈
⋂
θ˜i∈Θi
Yi[θ˜i] such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
If an unacceptable deception β is strictly refutable, then it is weakly refutable. This is
because strict refutability requires us to find a y in
⋂
θ˜i∈Θi
Yi[θ˜i] whereas for weak refutability,
we are allowed to find a y in Yi[θ˜i] that depends on θ˜i.
Definition 4.5. The SCF f satisfies strict robust monotonicity (strict RM) if every unac-
ceptable deception β is strictly refutable.
Strict RM implies weak RM because strict RM imposes a stronger refutability require-
ment on every unacceptable deception.
Bergemann and Morris (2010, Lemmata 4, 5, and 6 and Proposition 4) show that strict
RM is necessary for weak rationalizable implementation of responsive SCFs. The equiva-
lence between weak rationalizable implementation and robust implementation in rational-
izable strategies (Theorem 3.1) immediately implies that for responsive SCFs, strict RM
is a necessary condition for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies. Indeed, for
responsive SCFs, weak RM implies strict RM.
Lemma 4.6. If the SCF is responsive and satisfies weak RM, then it must satisfy strict
RM.5
However, there are non-responsive SCFs that satisfy weak RM but not strict RM, as
shown in Example 6.2.
5 Sufficiency for Robust Implementation in Rational-
izable Strategies
In this section, we show that weak RM is sufficient for robust implementation in rationalizable
strategies under a mild additional assumption: conditional no total indifference (as discussed
below, our definition is weaker than the one appearing in Bergemann and Morris, 2011).
5Here is an indirect argument to prove this statement. We show later that weak RM implies semi-strict
ex post incentive compatibility (semi-strict EPIC). Bergemann and Morris (2010, Lemma 4) show that for
responsive SCFs, semi-strict EPIC implies strict ex post incentive compatibility. Bergemann and Morris
(2010, Lemma 5) show that if the SCF satisfies strict ex post incentive compatibility and “strict pairwise
robust monotonicity”, then it satisfies strict RM. Strict pairwise robust monotonicity is weaker than weak
RM. It thus follows that if the SCF is responsive and satisfies weak RM, then it satisfies strict ex post
incentive compatibility and strict pairwise robust monotonicity, and hence it satisfies strict RM.
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For each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi, define
Y wi [θi] ≡
{
y : Θ−i → ∆(A) : ∀θ−i, ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥ ui
(
y(θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)}
.
Thus, Y wi [θi] is the collection of all mappings y : Θ−i → ∆(A) such that for every θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
the lottery y(θ−i) is weakly worse than f(θi, θ−i) for individual i in state (θi, θ−i). Notice
that Yi[θi] (recall the definition from Section 4) is a subset of Y
w
i [θi].
Definition 5.1. The SCF f satisfies conditional no total indifference (conditional NTI) if,
for all i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×Θ−i), there exist y, y
′
∈ Y wi [θi] such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y
′
(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
Remark: Bergemann and Morris (2011) also define a “conditional no total indifference”
condition which is stronger than our definition. They require the existence of the said y and
y
′
in the set
⋂
θ˜i∈Θi
Y wi [θ˜i] whereas we only require the existence of y and y
′
in the set Y wi [θi].
In the sufficiency result, we focus on a countable subset of Y wi [θi], as defined next. Recall
that ∆∗(A) is a countable dense subset of ∆(A). For each i and θi, define
Y ∗i [θi] ≡

y : Θ−i → ∆(A) :
∀θ−i,
(i) y(θ−i) ∈ ∆
∗(A)
⋃
θ
′
i
∈Θi
{f(θ
′
i, θ−i)} and
(ii) ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥ ui
(
y(θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)


Note that Y ∗i [θi] ⊆ Y
w
i [θi]. Since Θ−i is finite and ∆
∗(A) is countable, Y ∗i [θi] is also countable.
Thus, we denote Y ∗i [θi] by {y
0
i [θi], y
1
i [θi], . . . , y
k
i [θi], . . .}. For each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi, we then
define yθii such that
yθii (θ−i) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=0
δkyki [θi](θ−i), ∀θ−i,
where δ ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, since A is countable, we denote it by {a0, a1, . . . , ak, . . .}. Then, we define
α¯ = (1− η)
∞∑
k=0
ηkak,
where η ∈ (0, 1).
The following lemma notes two important consequences of conditional NTI.
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Lemma 5.2. If the SCF f satisfies conditional NTI, then the following statements are true:
(a) For all i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi and ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×Θ−i), there exists y ∈ Y
∗
i [θi] such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
yθii (θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
(b) For all i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi and z
1
i ∈ ∆(Θ−i), there exists a ∈ A such that
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
a, (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
α¯, (θi, θ−i)
)
.
Proof. We prove (a) first. Suppose the SCF f satisfies conditional NTI. Pick any i ∈ I,
θi ∈ Θi and ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×Θ−i).
Firstly, it follows from the definition of conditional NTI that for all θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i, there
exists ℓθ
′
−i ∈ ∆(A) such that
ui
(
f(θi, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
> ui
(
ℓθ
′
−i , (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
. (4)
To see this, consider the degenerate belief ψ˜i such that ψ˜i(θ
′
−i, θ
′
−i) = 1. Then there must
exist y˜, y˜
′
∈ Y wi [θi] such that
ui
(
f(θi, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
≥ ui
(
y˜(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i,θ
′′
−i
ψ˜i(θ−i, θ
′′
−i)ui
(
y˜(θ
′′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′′
−i
ψ˜i(θ−i, θ
′′
−i)ui
(
y˜
′
(θ
′′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
= ui
(
y˜
′
(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
,
where the first weak inequality follows from the fact that y˜ ∈ Y wi [θi] and the strict inequality
follows from conditional NTI. Then ℓθ
′
−i = y˜
′
(θ
′
−i) satisfies (4).
Secondly, since f satisfies conditional NTI, there exist y, y
′
∈ Y wi [θi] such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y
′
(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
Pick any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and define yǫ : Θ−i → ∆(A) such that y
ǫ(θ
′
−i) = (1− ǫ)y(θ
′
−i) + ǫℓ
θ
′
−i for
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all θ
′
−i. We similarly define y
′ǫ. By construction, yǫ and y
′ǫ are such that for all θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i,
ui
(
f(θi, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
> ui
(
yǫ(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
and ui
(
f(θi, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
> ui
(
y
′ǫ(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
.
For ǫ sufficiently close to 1, we have
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
yǫ(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y
′ǫ(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
We fix any such sufficiently large ǫ.
Thirdly, since ∆∗(A) is a dense subset of ∆(A), for each θ
′
−i, there exists a sequence of
lotteries {ℓz(θ
′
−i)}
∞
z=1 ∈ ∆
∗(A) converging to yǫ(θ
′
−i). For each z ≥ 1, define y
z : Θ−i →
∆∗(A) such that yz(θ
′
−i) = ℓ
z(θ
′
−i) for all θ
′
−i. Similarly, we can define y
′z : Θ−i → ∆
∗(A)
such that y
′z(θ
′
−i) converges to y
′ǫ(θ
′
−i) for all θ
′
−i. As Θ−i is finite, there exists a sufficiently
large z such that
ui
(
f(θi, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
> ui
(
yz(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
and ui
(
f(θi, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
> ui
(
y
′z(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ
′
−i)
)
,
for all θ
′
−i, and
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
yz(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y
′z(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
. (5)
The first set of inequalities imply that yz, y
′z ∈ Y ∗i [θi].
Lastly, since yθii assigns a positive weight to all y ∈ Y
∗
i [θi], if
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
yθii (θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
, ∀y ∈ Y ∗i [θi],
then it must be that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
yz(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y
′z(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
,
which contradicts (5).
We prove (b) next. Suppose the SCF f satisfies conditional NTI. Pick any i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi
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and z1i ∈ ∆(Θ−i). As α¯ assigns a positive weight to all a ∈ A, if
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
α¯, (θi, θ−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
a, (θi, θ−i)
)
, ∀a ∈ A,
then it must be that
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
a, (θi, θ−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
a
′
, (θi, θ−i)
)
,
for all a, a
′
∈ A. Now consider the belief ψ˜i ∈ ∆(Θ−i×Θ−i) such that ψ˜i(θ−i, θ−i) = z
1
i (θ−i)
for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i. Then, by conditional NTI, there must exist y˜, y˜
′
∈ Y wi [θi] such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y˜(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y˜
′
(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
But the left-hand side of the above inequality equals
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
y˜(θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
while
the right-hand side equals
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
y˜
′
(θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
, which contradicts the fact that
type θi is indifferent over all alternatives when she holds the belief z
1
i .
We need one more result before presenting our main sufficiency result for this section.
We now show that weak RM implies semi-strict ex post incentive compatibility.
Definition 5.3. The SCF f satisfies ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) if, for all i ∈ I,
θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi, and θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥ ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
The SCF f satisfies semi-strict ex post incentive compatible (semi-strict EPIC) if the above
inequality becomes strict whenever θi 6∼
f
i θ
′
i.
Lemma 5.4. If the SCF f satisfies weak RM, then it satisfies semi-strict EPIC.6
Proof. Suppose the SCF f satisfies weak RM. Pick any i ∈ I, θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi. If θi ∼
f
i θ
′
i,
then trivially ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥ ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i. So suppose
6Bergemann and Morris (2010, Lemma 6) show that if f is weakly rationalizable implementable, then
it satisfies semi-strict EPIC. It follows from their result and our Theorem 3.1 that semi-strict EPIC is
a necessary condition for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies. The above lemma does not
immediately follow from Bergemann and Morris’s result because weak RM is a necessary condition for weak
rationalizable implementation. Moreover, due to this lemma, we do not have to add semi-strict EPIC as an
additional condition in our sufficiency result. Bergemann and Morris (2011, Lemma 1) show that “robust
monotonicity” implies semi-strict EPIC. Robust monotonicity is a slightly weaker version of strict RM – the
only difference is that we need to replace “y ∈
⋂
θ˜i
Yi[θ˜i]” with “y ∈
⋂
θ˜i
Y w
i
[θ˜i]” in the definition of strict
refutability. Strictly speaking, weak RM and robust monotonicity are not comparable.
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θi 6∼
f
i θ
′
i. Consider the deception β such that βj(θj) = {θj} for all θj and j 6= i but
βi(θ˜i) =
{
{θi, θ
′
i}, if θ˜i = θi
{θ˜i}, otherwise.
Since θi 6∼
f
i θ
′
i, the deception β is unacceptable. Hence, it must be weakly refutable. That
is, there exist j ∈ I, θˆj ∈ Θj, and θˆ
′
j ∈ βj(θˆj) satisfying θˆ
′
j 6∼
f
j θˆj such that for any θ˜j ∈ Θj
and ψj ∈ ∆(Θ−j ×Θ−j) satisfying ψj(θ−j, θ
′
−j) > 0⇒ θ
′
−j ∈ β−j(θ−j), there exists y ∈ Yj[θ˜j ]
such that
∑
θ−j ,θ
′
−j
ψj(θ−j, θ
′
−j)uj
(
y(θ
′
−j), (θˆj , θ−j)
)
>
∑
θ−j ,θ
′
−j
ψj(θ−j , θ
′
−j)uj
(
f(θˆ
′
j , θ
′
−j), (θˆj, θ−j)
)
.
Since θˆ
′
j 6∼
f
j θˆj and θˆ
′
j ∈ βj(θˆj), it must be that j = i, θˆj = θi and θˆ
′
j = θ
′
i.
Now pick any θ−i ∈ Θ−i. Consider θ˜i = θi and the degenerate belief ψi such that
ψi(θ−i, θ−i) = 1. Note that θ−i ∈ β−i(θ−i). Hence, we must have some y ∈ Yi[θ˜i] = Yi[θi]
such that
ui
(
y(θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
> ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
But y ∈ Yi[θi] implies that ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥ ui
(
y(θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
. Therefore,
ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
> ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
For the sufficiency result, we propose the following mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g): For
each individual i, pick any one payoff type from Θi. We denote this payoff type as θ
∗
i .
Each individual i sends a message mi = (m
1
i , m
2
i , m
3
i , m
4
i ), where m
1
i = (m
1
i [j])j∈I such that
m1i [j] ∈ Θj for all j ∈ I, m
2
i ∈ N, m
3
i = (m
3
i [θi])θi∈Θi such that m
3
i [θi] ∈ Y
∗
i [θi] for all θi ∈ Θi,
and m4i ∈ A. Note that each Mi is countable. The outcome function g : M → ∆(A) is
defined as follows: For each m ∈M ,
Rule 1: m2i = 1 for all i ∈ I ⇒ g(m) = f(m
1
1[1], m
1
2[2], . . . , m
1
n[n]).
Rule 2: If there exists i ∈ I such that m2i > 1 but m
2
j = 1 for all j ∈ I\{i}, then one of the
following sub-rules apply:
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Rule 2-1: If there exists θi ∈ Θi such that m
1
j [i] = θi for all j ∈ I\{i}, then
g(m) =
{
m3i [θi]
(
(m1j [j])j 6=i
)
with probability m2i /(m
2
i + 1),
yθii
(
(m1j [j])j 6=i
)
with probability 1/(m2i + 1).
Rule 2-2: If m1
j
′ [i] 6= m1k[i] for some j
′
, k ∈ I\{i}, then
g(m) =
{
m3i [θ
∗
i ]
(
(m1j [j])j 6=i
)
with probability m2i /(m
2
i + 1),
y
θ∗i
i
(
(m1j [j])j 6=i
)
with probability 1/(m2i + 1).
Rule 3: In all other cases:
g(m) =


m41 with probability m
2
1/(1 +m
2
1)n,
m42 with probability m
2
2/(1 +m
2
2)n,
...
...
m4n with probability m
2
n/(1 +m
2
n)n,
α¯ with remaining probability.
Here is our sufficiency result for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies:
Theorem 5.5. If the SCF f satisfies weak RM and conditional NTI, it is robustly imple-
mentable in rationalizable strategies.
Proof. : We use the mechanism Γ constructed above and prove that Γ weakly robustly
implements f , which implies that Γ robustly implements f in rationalizable strategies because
of Theorem 3.1. The proof of the theorem consists of Steps 1 through 4.
Step 1: mi ∈ S
∞
i (θi)⇒ m
2
i = 1.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that mi ∈ S
∞
i (θi) but m
2
i > 1. Then, mi is a best
response of individual i of payoff type θi against some conjecture ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i).
For each θ
′
i 6= θ
∗
i and θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i, we define
M2−i(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i) =
{
m−i : m
2
j = 1 and m
1
j [i] = θ
′
i, ∀j 6= i, and (m
1
j [j])j 6=i = θ
′
−i
}
.
For θ∗i and each θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i, we define
M2−i(θ
∗
i , θ
′
−i) =

m−i :
(m1j [j])j 6=i = θ
′
−i and
either m2j = 1 and m
1
j [i] = θ
∗
i , ∀j 6= i,
or m2j = 1, ∀j 6= i, but m
1
j
′ [i] 6= m1k[i] for some j
′
, k 6= i

 .
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Also define
M3−i =
{
m−i : there exist one or more j 6= i such that m
2
j > 1
}
.
Note that
(
(M2−i(θ˜i, θ
′
−i))θ˜i∈Θi,θ′−i∈Θ−i
,M3−i
)
defines a partition of M−i. As m
2
i > 1, if
m−i ∈ M
2
−i(θ˜i, θ
′
−i), then Rule 2 is used under the profile (mi, m−i) whereas if m−i ∈ M
3
−i,
then Rule 3 is used under the profile (mi, m−i).
For each θ˜i ∈ Θi, define
Ψ2,θ˜ii =
∑
θ−i,θ
′′
−i
∑
m−i∈M
2
−i(θ˜i,θ
′′
−i)
ψi(θ−i, m−i).
Thus, Ψ2,θ˜ii is the probability of the event that all other individuals report a message profile
in
⋃
θ
′′
−i
M2−i(θ˜i, θ
′′
−i).
Also, define
Ψ3i =
∑
θ−i,m−i∈M
3
−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i).
Thus, Ψ3i is the probability of the event that all other individuals report a message profile
in M3−i.
If θ˜i is such that Ψ
2,θ˜i
i > 0, then define ψ
2,θ˜i
i ∈ ∆(Θ−i×Θ−i) such that for all θ−i, θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i,
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i) =
∑
m−i∈M
2
−i(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
ψi(θ−i, m−i)
Ψ2,θ˜ii
.
Thus, ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i) is the conditional probability of the event that the payoff-type profile of
all other individuals is θ−i and they report a message profile in M
2
−i(θ˜i, θ
′
−i) given the event
that all other individuals report a message profile in
⋃
θ
′′
−i
M2−i(θ˜i, θ
′′
−i).
If the payoff-type profile of all other individuals is θ−i and they report a message profile
in M2−i(θ˜i, θ
′
−i), then when individual i of payoff type θi plays mi, she expects the outcome
to be given by the lottery
(
m2i
1 +m2i
)
m3i [θ˜i]
(
θ
′
−i
)
+
(
1−
m2i
1 +m2i
)
yθ˜ii
(
θ
′
−i
)
.
As a result, conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message profile in
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⋃
θ
′′
−i
M2−i(θ˜i, θ
′′
−i), the expected payoff of individual i of payoff type θi when she plays mi is
(
m2i
1 +m2i
) ∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
m3i [θ˜i](θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
+
(
1−
m2i
1 +m2i
) ∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
yθ˜ii (θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
. (6)
If Ψ3i > 0, then define ψ
3
i ∈ ∆(Θ−i) such that, for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
ψ3i (θ−i) =
∑
m−i∈M
3
−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)
Ψ3i
.
Thus, ψ3i (θ−i) is the conditional probability of the event that the payoff-type profile of all
other individuals is θ−i and they report a message profile in M
3
−i given the event that all
other individuals report a message profile in M3−i.
If the payoff-type profile of all other individuals is θ−i and they report a message profile
m−i ∈ M
3
−i, then when individual i of payoff type θi plays mi, she expects the outcome to
be given by the lottery
1
n
(
m2i
1 +m2i
)
m4i +
1
n
(
1−
m2i
1 +m2i
)
α¯ +
∑
j 6=i
(
1
n
(
m2j
1 +m2j
)
m4j +
1
n
(
1−
m2j
1 +m2j
)
α¯
)
.
As a result, conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message profile in
M3−i, the expected payoff of individual i of payoff type θi when she plays mi is
1
n
(
m2i
1 +m2i
)∑
θ−i
ψ3i (θ−i)ui
(
m4i , (θi, θ−i)
)
+
1
n
(
1−
m2i
1 +m2i
)∑
θ−i
ψ3i (θ−i)ui
(
α¯, (θi, θ−i)
)
+
∑
θ−i,m−i∈M
3
−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)
Ψ3i
∑
j 6=i
(
1
n
(
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ui
(
m4j , (θi, θ−i)
)
+
1
n
(
1−
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ui
(
α¯, (θi, θ−i)
))
.
(7)
Now let individual i of type θi deviate to mˆi = (m
1
i , mˆ
2
i , mˆ
3
i , mˆ
4
i ) such that
• mˆ2i = m
2
i + 1.
• mˆ3i is defined as follows for each θ˜i:
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⊲ If Ψ2,θ˜ii > 0, then let mˆ
3
i [θ˜i] ∈ Y
∗
i [θ˜i] be such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
mˆ3i [θ˜i](θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
m3i [θ˜i](θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
and∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
mˆ3i [θ˜i](θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui(y
θ˜i
i (θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
Note that such mˆ3i [θ˜i] exists because of Lemma 5.2.
⊲ If Ψ2,θ˜ii = 0, then let mˆ
3
i [θ˜i] = m
3
i [θ˜i].
• mˆ4i is defined as follows:
⊲ If Ψ3i > 0, then let mˆ
4
i ∈ A be such that
∑
θ−i
ψ3i (θ−i)ui
(
mˆ4i , (θi, θ−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i
ψ3i (θ−i)ui
(
m4i , (θi, θ−i)
)
and∑
θ−i
ψ3i (θ−i)ui
(
mˆ4i , (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i
ψ3i (θ−i)ui
(
α¯, (θi, θ−i)
)
.
Note that such mˆ4i exists because of Lemma 5.2.
⊲ If Ψ3i = 0, then let mˆ
4
i = m
4
i .
If Ψ2,θ˜ii > 0, then conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message
profile in
⋃
θ
′′
−i
M2−i(θ˜i, θ
′′
−i), the expected payoff of individual i of payoff type θi when she
plays mˆi is (
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
) ∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
mˆ3i [θ˜i](θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
+
(
1−
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
) ∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ2,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
yθ˜ii (θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
,
which is, by construction, greater than her expected payoff in (6) when she plays mi.
If Ψ3i > 0, then conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message profile
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in M3−i, the expected payoff of individual i of payoff type θi when she plays mˆi is
1
n
(
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
)∑
θ−i
ψ3i (θ−i)ui
(
mˆ4i , (θi, θ−i)
)
+
1
n
(
1−
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
)∑
θ−i
ψ3i (θ−i)ui
(
α¯, (θi, θ−i)
)
+
∑
θ−i,m−i∈M
3
−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)
Ψ3i
∑
j 6=i
(
1
n
(
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ui
(
m4j , (θi, θ−i)
)
+
1
n
(
1−
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ui
(
α¯, (θi, θ−i)
))
,
which is, by construction, greater than her expected payoff in (7) when she plays mi.
As
∑
θ˜i
Ψ2,θ˜ii + Ψ
3
i = 1 (because m
2
i > 1), it follows that mˆi is a better response for
individual i of type θi against ψi, a contradiction. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: For each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi, let
βi(θi) = {θi} ∪ {θ
′
i ∈ Θi : ∃ mi ∈ S
∞
i (θi) such that m
1
i [i] = θ
′
i}.
Then, the deception β = (βi)i∈I is acceptable.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, β is unacceptable. Then, by weak RM, β must be weakly
refutable. That is, there exist i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi) satisfying θ
′
i 6∼
f
i θi such that for
all θ˜i ∈ Θi and ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×Θ−i) satisfying ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0⇒ θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i), there exists
y ∈ Yi[θ˜i] such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψi(θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
As θ
′
i 6∼
f
i θi and θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi), we can find a message mi ∈ S
∞
i (θi) such that m
1
i [i] = θ
′
i.
Then, mi is a best response to some belief ψ
Γ
i ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i) such that ψ
Γ
i (θ−i, m−i) >
0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i). From Step 1, it follows that ψ
Γ
i (θ−i, m−i) > 0 implies m
2
j = 1 for all
j 6= i. We next define a partition of all those message profiles in M−i such that m
2
j = 1 for
all j 6= i.
For each θˆi 6= θ
∗
i and θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i, we define
M1−i(θˆi, θ
′
−i) =
{
m−i : m
2
j = 1 and m
1
j [i] = θˆi, ∀j 6= i, and (m
1
j [j])j 6=i = θ
′
−i
}
.
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For θ∗i and each θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i, we define
M1−i(θ
∗
i , θ
′
−i) =

m−i :
(m1j [j])j 6=i = θ
′
−i and
either m2j = 1 and m
1
j [i] = θ
∗
i , ∀j 6= i,
or m2j = 1, ∀j 6= i, but m
1
j
′ [i] 6= m1k[i] for some j
′
, k 6= i

 .
For each θ˜i ∈ Θi, we define
Ψ1,θ˜ii =
∑
θ−i,θ
′′
−i
∑
m−i∈M
1
−i(θ˜i,θ
′′
−i)
ψΓi (θ−i, m−i).
Thus, Ψ1,θ˜ii is the probability of the event that all other individuals report a message profile
in
⋃
θ
′′
−i
M1−i(θ˜i, θ
′′
−i).
If θ˜i is such that Ψ
1,θ˜i
i > 0, then define ψ
1,θ˜i
i ∈ ∆(Θ−i×Θ−i) such that for all θ−i, θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i,
ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i) =
∑
m−i∈M
1
−i(θ˜i,θ
′
−i)
ψΓi (θ−i, m−i)
Ψ1,θ˜ii
.
Thus, ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i) is the conditional probability of the event that the payoff-type profile of
all other individuals is θ−i and they report a message profile in M
1
−i(θ˜i, θ
′
−i) given the event
that all other individuals report a message profile in
⋃
θ
′′
−i
M1−i(θ˜i, θ
′′
−i).
If the payoff-type profile of all other individuals is θ−i and they report a message profile
in M1−i(θ˜i, θ
′
−i), then when individual i of payoff type θi plays mi, she expects the outcome to
be f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i). As a result, conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message
profile in
⋃
θ
′′
−i
M1−i(θ˜i, θ
′′
−i), the expected payoff of individual i of payoff type θi when she
plays mi is
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
. (8)
Now, ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i) > 0 implies that ψ
Γ
i (θ−i, m−i) > 0 for some m−i ∈ M
1
−i(θ˜i, θ
′
−i). But
ψΓi (θ−i, m−i) > 0 also implies that m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i). Hence, due to the construction of β, we
have θ
′
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i). So, it follows from weak refutability of β that there exists y[θ˜i] ∈ Yi[θ˜i]
such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y[θ˜i](θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
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It is without loss of generality to assume that y[θ˜i] ∈ Y
∗
i [θ˜i]. If not, then consider
any sequence ℓz : Θ−i → ∆
∗(A) ∪ {f(θ˜i, θ−i)} such that (a) if y[θ˜i](θ−i) = f(θ˜i, θ−i), then
ℓz(θ−i) = f(θ˜i, θ−i) for all z ∈ N and (b) if y[θ˜i](θ−i) 6= f(θ˜i, θ−i), then ℓ
z(θ−i) converges to
y[θ˜i](θ−i) for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i as z →∞. As Θ−i is finite and ui(·, θ) is continuous over ∆(A),
we can find a sufficiently large zˆ such that
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
ℓzˆ(θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
>
∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
,
and, because y[θ˜i] ∈ Yi[θ˜i], if ℓ
zˆ(θ−i) 6= f(θ˜i, θ−i), then
ui
(
f(θ˜i, θ−i), (θ˜i, θ−i)
)
> ui
(
ℓzˆ(θ−i), (θ˜i, θ−i)
)
.
The latter condition implies that ℓzˆ ∈ Y ∗i [θ˜i].
Now, let individual i of type θi deviate to mˆi = (m
1
i , mˆ
2
i , mˆ
3
i , m
4
i ) such that
• mˆ2i > 1, where the specific value is chosen later.
• mˆ3i is defined as follows: for each θ˜i ∈ Θi:
⊲ If Ψ1,θ˜ii > 0, then let mˆ
3
i [θ˜i] = y[θ˜i].
⊲ If Ψ1,θ˜ii = 0, then let mˆ
3
i [θ˜i] = m
3
i [θ˜i].
If Ψ1,θ˜ii > 0, then conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message
profile in
⋃
θ
′′
−i
M1−i(θ˜i, θ
′′
−i), the expected payoff of individual i of payoff type θi when she
plays mˆi is (
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
) ∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
y[θ˜i](θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
+
(
1−
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
) ∑
θ−i,θ
′
−i
ψ1,θ˜ii (θ−i, θ
′
−i)ui
(
yθ˜ii (θ
′
−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
If mˆ2i is large enough, then the above expression is greater than her expected payoff in (8)
when she plays mi. Since Θi is finite, we can find a sufficiently large mˆ
2
i such that the
above statement is true for all θ˜i ∈ Θi such that Ψ
1,θ˜i
i > 0. As
∑
θ˜i
Ψ1,θ˜ii = 1 (because
ψΓi (θ−i, m−i) > 0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i) ⇒ m
2
j = 1, ∀j 6= i), it follows that mˆi is a better
response for individual i of type θi against ψ
Γ
i , a contradiction. This completes the proof of
Step 2.
It follows from Steps 1 and 2 that m ∈ S∞(θ)⇒ g(m) = f(θ).
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Step 3: Define the message correspondence profile with payoff-type domain S = (S1, . . . ,Sn)
such that for all i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi,
Si(θi) = {(m
1
i , 1, m
3
i , m
4
i ) : m
1
i [i] = θi}.
Then, we have bΘ(S) ≥ S, which implies that S ≤ S∞.
Proof. Pick any i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and mi ∈ Si(θi). Fix some θ−i ∈ Θ−i and pick any
m˜−i ∈ S−i(θ−i) such that m˜
1
j [i] = θi and m˜
1
j [j] = θj , for all j 6= i. Let the belief ψi ∈
∆(Θ−i ×M−i) be such that ψi(θ−i, m˜−i) = 1. When individual i of payoff type θi holds the
belief ψi and plays mi, then she expects the payoff of ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
. On the one
hand, if she deviates to mˆi such that mˆ
1
i [i] = θ
′
i and mˆ
2
i = 1, then she expects the payoff of
ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
, which is not improving due to semi-strict EPIC. On the other hand,
if she deviates to mˆi such that mˆ
2
i > 1, then she expects the payoff of(
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
)
ui
(
mˆ3i [θi](θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
+
(
1−
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
)
ui
(
yθii (θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
As mˆ3i [θi] ∈ Y
∗
i [θi], she cannot improve by any such deviation. Hence, mi ∈ b
Θ
i (S)[θi]. This
completes the proof of Step 3.
Step 4: Condition (2) in Theorem 3.1 is satisfied by the constructed mechanism
Proof. Pick i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi and z
1
i ∈ Z
1
i . For each θ−i ∈ Θ−i, pick some m˜−i ∈M−i such that
m˜1j [i] = θi, m˜
1
j [j] = θj , and m˜
2
j = 1 for all j 6= i. From Step 3, it follows that m˜−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i).
Define the belief ψi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i) such that ψi(θ−i, m˜−i) = z
1
i (θ−i) for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
By construction, ψi(θ−i, m−i) > 0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S
∞
−i(θ−i) and margΘ−iψi = z
1
i . When
individual i of payoff type θi holds the belief ψi and plays mi = (m
1
i , 1, m
3
i , m
4
i ) such that
m1i [i] = θi, then she expects the payoff of
∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
f(θi, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
. On the one
hand, if she deviates to mˆi such that mˆ
1
i [i] = θ
′
i and mˆ
2
i = 1, then she expects the payoff of∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
f(θ
′
i, θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
, which is not improving due to semi-strict EPIC. On the
other hand, if she deviates to mˆi such that mˆ
2
i > 1, then she expects the payoff of(
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
)∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
mˆ3i [θi](θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
+
(
1−
mˆ2i
1 + mˆ2i
)∑
θ−i
z1i (θ−i)ui
(
yθii (θ−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
.
As mˆ3i [θi] ∈ Y
∗
i [θi], she cannot improve by any such deviation. Hence,
arg max
m′i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i
ψi(θ−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m′i, m−i), (θi, θ−i)
)
6= ∅,
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which completes the proof of Step 4.
Steps 1 through 4 complete the proof of the theorem.
Remark 5.6. Bergemann and Morris (2011) show that strict RM and their stronger ver-
sion of conditional NTI are sufficient conditions for both rationalizable implementation and
robust implementation in interim equilibria. As rationalizable implementation implies weak
rationalizable implementation and the latter is equivalent to robust implementation in ra-
tionalizable strategies, we can conclude that strict RM and their stronger conditional NTI
are sufficient conditions for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies. Theorem 5.5
weakens both these conditions, thus providing us with a stronger sufficiency result for robust
implementation in rationalizable strategies.
6 Robust Implementation: Rationalizable Strategies
versus Interim Equilibria
In this section, we compare robust implementation in rationalizable strategies with robust
implementation in interim equilibria. A priori, robust implementation in rationalizable
strategies appears to be neither stronger nor weaker than robust implementation in in-
terim equilibria. On a given type space, any message profile that is supported in interim
equilibrium at some type profile is also rationalizable at that type profile. Therefore, the
nonemptiness requirement seems weaker whereas the uniqueness requirement seems stronger
in robust implementation in rationalizable strategies than in robust implementation in in-
terim equilibria.
It turns out that robust implementation in interim equilibria in fact implies robust im-
plementation in rationalizable strategies by the same mechanism. The nested relationship
between different implementation notions offers an indirect way to reach this conclusion: If
an SCF is robustly implementable in interim equilibria by a mechanism, then it is ratio-
nalizably implementable by the same mechanism (Bergemann and Morris, 2011, Theorem
3). Since rationalizable implementation implies weak rationalizable implementation, it fol-
lows from our Theorem 3.1 that the SCF is also robustly implementable in rationalizable
strategies by the same mechanism.
But the underlying reason why robust implementation in rationalizable strategies turns
out to be weaker than robust implementation in interim equilibria is that, while the nonempti-
ness requirement in the former concept is weaker than that in the latter concept, the unique-
ness requirements in the two concepts are in fact equivalent, as argued next.
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Corollary 6.1. Consider any mechanism Γ. There exists a type space T such that m ∈⋃
t∈T :θˆ(t)=θ B
∞(t) if and only if there exists a type space T
′
, an interim equilibrium σ of the
game (T
′
,Γ), and a type profile t
′
∈ T
′
such that σ(m|t
′
) > 0 and θˆ(t
′
) = θ.
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, there exists a type space T such that m ∈
⋃
t∈T :θˆ(t)=θ B
∞(t) if and
only if m ∈ S∞(θ). By Proposition 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2011), m ∈ S∞(θ) if and
only if there exists a type space T
′
, an interim equilibrium σ of the game (T
′
,Γ), and a type
profile t
′
∈ T
′
such that σ(m|t
′
) > 0 and θˆ(t
′
) = θ.
Thus, if a message profile m is rationalizable at some type profile t in some type space T
such that θˆ(t) = θ, then that message profile is also supported in some interim equilibrium
for some type-profile t
′
in some type space T
′
such that θˆ(t
′
) = θ, and vice versa. Hence,
insisting on robust implementation “over all type spaces” makes the uniqueness requirement
under the solution concept of interim equilibria equivalent to the uniqueness requirement
under the solution concept of rationalizable strategies.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: In Section 6.1, we show by means of an
example that robust implementation in rationalizable strategies is strictly more permissive
than that in interim equilibria. Section 6.2 establishes the equivalence between robust im-
plementation in rationalizable strategies and that in interim equilibria when we restrict our
attention to finite mechanisms.
6.1 An Example
We now present an example with an SCF that is robustly implementable in rationalizable
strategies but not in interim equilibria. We do so by exploiting the gap between strict
RM and weak RM for non-responsive SCFs. (As already mentioned, strict RM and weak
RM are equivalent for responsive SCFs.) To elaborate, Bergemann and Morris (2011) show
that strict RM is a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation of any SCF. The
non-responsive SCF in the example below fails to satisfy strict RM. Thus, the SCF is not
rationalizably implementable, and hence not robustly implementable in interim equilibria.
The SCF however satisfies weak RM and conditional NTI. Hence, the SCF is robustly im-
plementable in rationalizable strategies.
Thus robust implementation in interim equilibria is strictly stronger than robust imple-
mentation in rationalizable strategies. In light of our above discussion on the equivalence of
the uniqueness requirements under the two solution concepts, the explanation for this gap
between robust implementation in interim equilibria and robust implementation in ratio-
nalizable strategies is that the nonemptiness requirement in the former concept is strictly
stronger than the nonemptiness requirement in the latter concept. Any mechanism Γ, in
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particular the canonical mechanism constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.5, that robustly
implements the SCF in the example in rationalizable strategies must fail the nonemptiness
requirement for robust implementation in interim equilibria. That is, there must exist some
type space in which the set of interim equilibria of the mechanism is empty.
Example 6.2. There are two players i ∈ {1, 2}. Player 1 has three payoff types: Θ1 =
{θ1, θ
′
1, θ
′′
1} and player 2 has two payoff types: Θ2 = {θ2, θ
′
2}. There are six pure alternatives:
A = {a, b, c, d, z, z
′
}. The following tables list the payoffs of the two players:
a θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 4, 4 4, 0
θ
′
1 0, 0 4, 1
θ
′′
1 1, 1 4, 0
b θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 0, 0 3, 3
θ
′
1 1, 1 2, 0
θ
′′
1 0, 0 2, 1
c θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 0, 0 3, 1
θ
′
1 3, 3 3, 0
θ
′′
1 3, 3 3, 0
d θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 3, 4 2, 0
θ
′
1 0, 0 3, 3
θ
′′
1 0, 0 3, 3
z θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 4, 1 2, 0
θ
′
1 2, 2 5, 0
θ
′′
1 2, 2 2, 0
z
′
θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 4, 0 4, 1
θ
′
1 2, 0 2, 2
θ
′′
1 2, 0 5, 0
The SCF f selects the alternative which maximizes the aggregate payoff in each payoff
state.
f θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 a b
θ
′
1 c d
θ
′′
1 c d
We first show that f fails strict RM.
Claim 6.3. The SCF f violates strict RM.
Proof. Consider the deception β such that
β1(θ1) = {θ1, θ
′
1}, β1(θ
′
1) = {θ
′
1}, β1(θ
′′
1 ) = {θ
′′
1},
and
β2(θ2) = {θ2, θ
′
2}, β2(θ
′
2) = {θ
′
2}.
Given this deception, there are exactly two tuples (i, θi, θ
′
i) such that θ
′
i ∈ βi(θi) and θ
′
i 6∼
f
i θi:
(1, θ1, θ
′
1) and (2, θ2, θ
′
2).
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First, consider (2, θ2, θ
′
2). Fix the degenerate belief ψ2 ∈ ∆(Θ1×Θ1) such that ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1) =
1. Then, there does not exist any y ∈
⋂
θ˜2∈Θ2
Y2[θ˜2] such that
u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ1, θ2)
)
> u2
(
f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
,
because f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2) = d is one of the best alternatives for player 2 in the payoff state (θ1, θ2).
Second, consider (1, θ1, θ
′
1). Fix the degenerate belief ψ1 such that ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) = 1. If there
exists y ∈
⋂
θ˜1∈Θ1
Y1[θ˜1], then y(θ
′
2) must satisfy the following equations
u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
≥ u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
u1
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
≥ u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
.
These two inequalities imply that
2y(θ
′
2)[z] + y(θ
′
2)[a] ≤ y(θ
′
2)[z
′
] + y(θ
′
2)[b] and 2y(θ
′
2)[z
′
] + y(θ
′
2)[a] ≤ y(θ
′
2)[z] + y(θ
′
2)[b],
where y(θ
′
2)[x] is the probability of alternative x in the lottery y(θ
′
2). Summing these two
inequalities, we obtain y(θ
′
2)[z] + y(θ
′
2)[z
′
] + 2y(θ
′
2)[a] ≤ 2y(θ
′
2)[b]. In order to satisfy strict
RM, we must satisfy the following inequality:
u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
> u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
.
The above inequality is translated into y(θ
′
2)[z] + y(θ
′
2)[z
′
] + y(θ
′
2)[a] > 3y(θ
′
2)[b] + 3y(θ
′
2)[c].
We then claim that this inequality is impossible to be satisfied. Plugging y(θ
′
2)[z]+y(θ
′
2)[z
′
]+
2y(θ
′
2)[a] ≤ 2y(θ
′
2)[b] into y(θ
′
2)[z] + y(θ
′
2)[z
′
] + y(θ
′
2)[a] > 3y(θ
′
2)[b] + 3y(θ
′
2)[c], we obtain
−y(θ
′
2)[a] > y(θ
′
2)[b] + 3y(θ
′
2)[c].
However, this inequality is impossible because y(θ
′
2)[a], y(θ
′
2)[b], and y(θ
′
2)[c] all are nonneg-
ative. We therefore conclude that the SCF f does not satisfy strict RM.
Next we argue that f satisfies weak RM.
Claim 6.4. The SCF f satisfies weak RM.
Proof. First, we consider any unacceptable deception β such that either θ
′
1 ∈ β1(θ1) or
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θ
′′
1 ∈ β1(θ1). Pick any belief ψ1 ∈ ∆(Θ2 ×Θ2). Then
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
= 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 3ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 2ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2).
Similarly,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
= 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 3ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 2ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2).
In what follows, we consider each possible case of θ˜1 ∈ {θ1, θ
′
1, θ
′′
1}.
Case 1: θ˜1 = θ1.
Define y : Θ2 → ∆(A) to be such that y(θ2) = a and y(θ
′
2) =
2
3
z+ 1
3
z
′
. It is straightforward
to confirm that y ∈ Y1[θ1]. Moreover,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
= 4ψ1(θ2, θ2) + 4ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 4ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) +
8
3
ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
> 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 3ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 2ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
=
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
.
Similarly,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
>
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
.
Case 2: θ˜1 = θ
′
1.
Define y : Θ2 → ∆(A) to be such that y(θ2) = a and y(θ
′
2) = z
′
. It is straightforward to
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confirm that y ∈ Y1[θ
′
1]. Moreover,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
= 4ψ1(θ2, θ2) + 4ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 4ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 4ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
> 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 3ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 2ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
=
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
.
Similarly,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
>
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
.
Case 3: θ˜1 = θ
′′
1 .
Define y : Θ2 → ∆(A) to be such that y(θ2) = a and y(θ
′
2) =
1
5
c+ 4
5
z. It is straightforward
to confirm that y ∈ Y1[θ
′′
1 ]. Moreover,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
= 4ψ1(θ2, θ2) + 4ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) +
16
5
ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) +
11
5
ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
> 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 3ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 2ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
=
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′
1, θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
.
Similarly,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
>
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
.
It follows that any unacceptable deception β satisfying θ
′
1 ∈ β1(θ1) is weakly refutable
using the tuple (1, θ1, θ
′
1) whereas any unacceptable deception β satisfying θ
′′
1 ∈ β1(θ1) is
weakly refutable using the tuple (1, θ1, θ
′′
1 ).
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Second, we consider any unacceptable deception β such that θ
′
2 ∈ β2(θ2) and β1(θ1) =
{θ1}. Pick any belief ψ2 ∈ ∆(Θ1 × Θ1) such that ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1) > 0 ⇒ θ˜
′
1 ∈ β1(θ˜1). Then we
have ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1) = ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 ) = 0. Therefore,
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2
(
f(θ˜
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ˜1, θ2)
)
= ψ2(θ1, θ1)u2
(
f(θ1, θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1)u2
(
f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 )u2
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)u2
(
f(θ1, θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1)u2
(
f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )u2
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1)u2
(
f(θ1, θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1)u2
(
f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )u2
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
= ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1).
Define y : Θ1 → ∆(A) to be such that y(θ1) = y(θ
′
1) = y(θ
′′
1 ) = z. It is straightforward
to confirm that y ∈ Y2[θ2] ∩ Y2[θ
′
2]. Moreover, since ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1) = ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 ) = 0, we have
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2
(
y(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ2)
)
= ψ2(θ1, θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 )u2
(
y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )u2
(
y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )u2
(
y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
= ψ2(θ1, θ1) + 2
(
ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )
)
+ 2
(
ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1) + ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )
)
> ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)
=
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2
(
f(θ˜
′
1, θ
′
2), (θ˜1, θ2)
)
.
It follows that any unacceptable deception β such that θ
′
2 ∈ β2(θ2) and β1(θ1) = {θ1} is
weakly refutable using the tuple (2, θ2, θ
′
2).
Third, we consider any unacceptable deception β such that θ2 ∈ β2(θ
′
2) and β1(θ1) = {θ1}.
Pick any belief ψ2 ∈ ∆(Θ1×Θ1) such that ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1) > 0⇒ θ˜
′
1 ∈ β1(θ˜1). Then we have that
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ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1) = ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 ) = 0. Therefore,
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2
(
f(θ˜
′
1, θ2), (θ˜1, θ
′
2)
)
= ψ2(θ1, θ1)u2
(
f(θ1, θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1)u2
(
f(θ
′
1, θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 )u2
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)u2
(
f(θ1, θ2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1)u2
(
f(θ
′
1, θ2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )u2
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1)u2
(
f(θ1, θ2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1)u2
(
f(θ
′
1, θ2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )u2
(
f(θ
′′
1 , θ2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
= ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1).
Define y : Θ1 → ∆(A) to be such that y(θ1) = y(θ
′
1) = y(θ
′′
1 ) =
1
4
b + 3
4
z
′
. It is straight-
forward to confirm that y ∈ Y2[θ2] ∩ Y2[θ
′
2]. Moreover, since ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1) = ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 ) = 0, we
have
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2
(
y(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ
′
2)
)
= ψ2(θ1, θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 )u2
(
y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )u2
(
y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )u2
(
y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
=
3
2
ψ2(θ1, θ1) +
3
2
(
ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )
)
+
1
4
(
ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1) + ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )
)
> ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)
=
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2
(
f(θ˜
′
1, θ2), (θ˜1, θ
′
2)
)
.
It follows that any unacceptable deception β such that θ2 ∈ β2(θ
′
2) and β1(θ1) = {θ1} is
weakly refutable using the tuple (2, θ
′
2, θ2).
Fourth, we consider any unacceptable deception such that β1(θ1) = {θ1}, β2(θ2) = {θ2},
and β2(θ
′
2) = {θ
′
2}. Such a deception involves either θ1 ∈ β1(θ
′
1) or θ1 ∈ β1(θ
′′
1 ). Then the fact
that f satisfies semi-strict EPIC implies that β is weakly refutable. We show this formally
for the case when θ1 ∈ β1(θ
′
1) as the argument for the case when θ1 ∈ β1(θ
′′
1 ) is similar. So
suppose θ1 ∈ β1(θ
′
1). Pick any belief ψ1 ∈ ∆(Θ2×Θ2) such that ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2) > 0⇒ θ˜
′
2 ∈ β2(θ˜2).
Then we have that ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) = ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) = 0. Therefore,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ1, θ˜
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ˜2)
)
= 2ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
Define y : Θ2 → ∆(A) to be such that y(θ2) = f(θ
′
1, θ2) = c and y(θ
′
2) = f(θ
′
1, θ
′
2) = d. It
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is straightforward to confirm that y ∈ Y1[θ1] ∩ Y1[θ
′
1] ∩ Y1[θ
′′
1 ]. Moreover, since ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) =
ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) = 0,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ˜2)
)
= 3ψ1(θ2, θ2) + 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2) >
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
f(θ1, θ˜
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ˜2)
)
.
It follows that the deception β is weakly refutable using the tuple (1, θ
′
1, θ1).
We thus conclude that every unacceptable deception is weakly refutable, and hence f
satisfies weak RM.
We now check that the SCF f satisfies conditional NTI.
Claim 6.5. The SCF f satisfies conditional NTI.
Proof. First, we consider player 1 of payoff type θ1. Let y : Θ2 → ∆(A) be such that
y(θ2) = a and y(θ
′
2) = z. Also, let y
′
: Θ2 → ∆(A) be such that y
′
(θ2) = b and y
′
(θ
′
2) = d. It
is straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [θ1]. Now,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
= 4ψ1(θ2, θ2) + 4ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 4ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 2ψi(θ
′
2, θ
′
2).
whereas
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y
′
(θ2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y
′
(θ2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
= 3ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 2ψi(θ
′
2, θ
′
2).
We therefore have that
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
=
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
⇔ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2) = 1.
Thus, for all ψ1 ∈ ∆(Θ2 × Θ2) such that ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2) < 1, we have found y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [θ1]
that satisfy the requirement for conditional NTI. If ψ1 is such that ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2) = 1, then
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we define y : Θ2 → ∆(A) such that y(θ2) = y(θ
′
2) = b and y
′
: Θ2 → ∆(A) such that
y
′
(θ2) = y
′
(θ
′
2) = d. It is straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [θ1]. Since ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2) = 1,
u1(y(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ
′
2)) = u1(b, (θ1, θ
′
2)) = 3 and u1(y
′
(θ
′
2), (θ1, θ
′
2)) = u1(d, (θ1, θ
′
2)) = 2, we obtain
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
>
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ˜
′
2), (θ1, θ˜2)
)
.
Thus, if ψ1 is such that ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2) = 1, then too we satisfy the requirement for conditional
NTI.
Second, we consider player 1 of payoff type θ
′
1. Then we define y : Θ2 → ∆(A) such that
y(θ2) = y(θ
′
2) = c and y
′
: Θ2 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(θ2) = y
′
(θ
′
2) = b. It is straightforward to
confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [θ
′
1]. Fix ψ1 ∈ ∆(Θ2 ×Θ2). Now,
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
= 3ψ1(θ2, θ2) + 3ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 3ψi(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
whereas
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y
′
(θ2), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y
′
(θ2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2) + ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 2ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 2ψi(θ
′
2, θ
′
2).
This implies that for any ψ1 ∈ ∆(Θ2 ×Θ2),
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ˜2)
)
>
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′
1, θ˜2)
)
.
Thus, we satisfy the requirement for conditional NTI.
Third, we consider player 1 of payoff type θ
′′
1 . Once again, we define y : Θ2 → ∆(A)
such that y(θ2) = y(θ
′
2) = c and y
′
: Θ2 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(θ2) = y
′
(θ
′
2) = b. It is
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straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [θ
′′
1 ]. Fix ψ1 ∈ ∆(Θ2 ×Θ2). Now
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y(θ2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y(θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
= 3ψ1(θ2, θ2) + 3ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2) + 3ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 3ψi(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)
whereas
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ˜2)
)
= ψ1(θ2, θ2)u1
(
y
′
(θ2), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ1(θ2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2)u1
(
y
′
(θ2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(θ
′
2, θ
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
= 2ψ1(θ
′
2, θ2) + 2ψi(θ
′
2, θ
′
2).
This implies that for any ψ1 ∈ ∆(Θ2 ×Θ2),
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ˜2)
)
>
∑
θ˜2,θ˜
′
2
ψ1(θ˜2, θ˜
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(θ˜
′
2), (θ
′′
1 , θ˜2)
)
.
Thus, we satisfy the requirement for conditional NTI.
Fourth, we consider player 2 of payoff type θ2. Then we define y : Θ1 → ∆(A) such that
y(θ1) = y(θ
′
1) = y(θ
′′
1 ) =
1
2
a + 1
2
c and y
′
: Θ1 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(θ1) = y
′
(θ
′
1) = y(θ
′′
1 ) = b.
It is straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w2 [θ2]. Fix ψ2 ∈ ∆(Θ2 ×Θ2). Now
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2(y(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ2))
= ψ2(θ1, θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 )u2(y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ1, θ2))
+ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )u2(y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′
1, θ2))
+ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )u2(y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′′
1 , θ2))
= 2(ψ1(θ1, θ1) + ψ1(θ1, θ
′
1) + ψ1(θ1, θ
′′
1 )) +
3
2
(ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 ))
+2(ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1) + ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 ))
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whereas
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2(y
′
(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ2))
= ψ2(θ1, θ1)u2
(
y
′
(θ1), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(θ
′
1), (θ1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 )u2(y
′
(θ
′′
1 ), (θ1, θ2))
+ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)u2
(
y
′
(θ1), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(θ
′
1), (θ
′
1, θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )u2(y
′
(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′
1, θ2))
+ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1)u2
(
y
′
(θ1), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(θ
′
1), (θ
′′
1 , θ2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )u2(y
′
(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′′
1 , θ2))
= ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 ).
This implies that for any ψ2 ∈ ∆(Θ1 ×Θ1),
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2(y(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ2)) >
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2(y
′
(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ2)).
Thus, we satisfy the requirement for conditional NTI.
Finally, we consider player 2 of payoff type θ
′
2. Then we define y : Θ1 → ∆(A) such that
y(θ1) = y(θ
′
1) = y(θ
′′
1 ) =
1
2
b+ 1
2
d and y
′
: Θ1 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(θ1) = y
′
(θ
′
1) = y(θ
′′
1 ) = c.
It is straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w2 [θ
′
2]. Fix ψ2 ∈ ∆(Θ1 ×Θ1). Then
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2(y(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ
′
2))
= ψ2(θ1, θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 )u2(y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ1, θ
′
2))
+ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )u2(y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2))
+ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1)u2
(
y(θ1), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1)u2
(
y(θ
′
1), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )u2(y(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2))
=
3
2
(ψ1(θ1, θ1) + ψ1(θ1, θ
′
1) + ψ1(θ1, θ
′′
1 )) +
3
2
(ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 ))
+2(ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1) + ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 ))
whereas
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2(y
′
(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ
′
2))
= ψ2(θ1, θ1)u2
(
y
′
(θ1), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(θ
′
1), (θ1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 )u2(y
′
(θ
′′
1 ), (θ1, θ
′
2))
+ψ2(θ
′
1, θ1)u2
(
y
′
(θ1), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(θ
′
1), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′
1, θ
′′
1 )u2(y
′
(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′
1, θ
′
2))
+ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ1)u2
(
y
′
(θ1), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(θ
′
1), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2)
)
+ ψ2(θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
1 )u2(y
′
(θ
′′
1 ), (θ
′′
1 , θ
′
2))
= ψ2(θ1, θ1) + ψ2(θ1, θ
′
1) + ψ2(θ1, θ
′′
1 ).
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This implies that for any ψ2 ∈ ∆(Θ1 ×Θ1),
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2(y(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ
′
2)) >
∑
θ˜1,θ˜
′
1
ψ2(θ˜1, θ˜
′
1)u2(y
′
(θ˜
′
1), (θ˜1, θ
′
2)).
Thus, we satisfy the requirement for conditional NTI.
We therefore conclude that f satisfies conditional NTI.
6.2 Finite Mechanisms
The SCF in the above example satisfies weak RM and conditional NTI, and hence is robustly
implementable in rationalizable strategies using the canonical mechanism constructed in The-
orem 5.5. The canonical mechanism, however, is countably infinite. If we restrict attention
to finite mechanisms, then the set of interim equilibria in every countable type space is
nonempty. Hence, robust implementation in interim equilibria becomes equivalent to robust
implementation in rationalizable strategies.
Proposition 6.6. The SCF f is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies by a
finite mechanism Γ if and only if f is robustly implementable in interim equilibria by the
same mechanism Γ.
Proof. We have already argued that if f is robustly implementable in interim equilibria by
some mechanism, then it is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies by the same
mechanism. To argue the converse, suppose f is robustly implementable in rationalizable
strategies by a finite mechanism Γ. Consider any type space T . First, because the mechanism
Γ is finite and Ti is countable for all i, there exists an interim equilibrium for the game (T ,Γ)
on every type space T .7 Second, suppose σ is an interim equilibrium of the game (T ,Γ).
If σ(t)[m] > 0 such that θˆ(t) = θ, then by Corollary 6.1 there exists a type space T
′
such
that m ∈
⋃
t
′
∈T
′ :θˆ(t′ )=θ B
∞(t
′
). Since Γ robustly implements f in rationalizable strategies,
g(m) = f(θ).
Bergemann and Morris (2011) show that an additional “robust measurability” condition
is necessary for robust implementation in interim equilibria using finite mechanisms. It thus
follows that robust measurability is also necessary for robust implementation in rational-
izable strategies using finite mechanisms. Robust measurability is generally not related to
weak RM.8 It is therefore an additional restriction on robust implementation in rational-
izable strategies when using finite mechanisms. However, for the class of “single crossing
7For a proof of this statement, see Footnote 14 in Bergemann et al. (2017).
8We can show this using Examples 1 and 2 in Section 8.3 in Bergemann and Morris (2007).
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aggregator” environments, robust measurability is equivalent to strict RM (see section 5 in
Bergemann and Morris (2011) for details). In such environments, any responsive SCF satis-
fying strict RM can be robustly implemented in interim equilibria using a direct mechanism
in which players report their payoff types (Bergemann and Morris, 2009). Recall that strict
RM is equivalent to weak RM for responsive SCFs. Thus, it follows that for responsive SCFs,
weak RM characterizes robust implementation in rationalizable strategies in single crossing
aggregator environments even when the designer is restricted to finite mechanisms.
In a complete information environment with lotteries and transfers, Chen, Kunimoto,
Sun, and Xiong (2020) show that Maskin monotonicity*, a strengthening of Maskin monot-
nicity, is a necessary and sufficient condition for implementation in rationalizable strategies
by a finite mechanism. They also show that Maskin monotonicity* is strictly stronger than
Maskin monotonicity, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation
by a finite mechanism in the same class of environments with transfers and lotteries (See
Chen, Kunimoto, Sun, and Xiong (2019)). Therefore, if we restrict our attention to finite
mechanisms in a complete information setup, implementation in rationalizable strategies
is more restrictive than Nash implementation. This exhibits a contrast with our Proposi-
tion 6.6, which establishes the equivalence between robust implementation in rationalizable
strategies and that in interim equilibria in finite mechanisms. In other words, the robustness
consideration within the class of finite mechanisms makes the difference between rationaliz-
able strategies and equilibria moot.
7 Conclusion
We showed that robust implementation in rationalizable strategies is equivalent to weak
rationalizable implementation. We utilized this equivalence result to prove that weak RM
is necessary and almost sufficient for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies.
The equivalence result also helped us establish that if a mechanism robustly implements
an SCF in interim equilibria, then the same mechanism robustly implements the SCF in
rationalizable strategies too. However, the converse is not necessarily true if the SCF is non-
responsive and the designer is allowed to use countably infinite mechanisms. We argued that
this gap between robust implementation in interim equilibria and robust implementation in
rationalizable strategies is explained by the more stringent nonemptiness requirement under
the former concept because the two concepts impose the same uniqueness requirement. An
open question is whether there is any gap between the two concepts for the case of responsive
SCFs.
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